Chapter 8 — Value Theory

8.1 The Fact-Value Distinction

Descriptive vs. Evaluative Claims

Descriptive Claims: How the World Is

Evaluative Claims: How the World Ought to Be

The Naturalistic Fallacy

Hume and the Is-Ought Problem

The Open-Question Argument

Objections to the Fact-Value Distinction

Putnam's Objection to the Fact-Value Distinction

Lack of Distinction Claims

Claims of Objective Moral Reasoning


8.2 Basic Questions about Values

Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value

Fundamentality

Incommensurability

Moral Pluralism vs. Moral Relativism


8.3 Metaethics

Ontology of Value

Realism and Anti-realism

The Importance of Debate within Moral Realism

The Importance of Moral Resolution

Divine and Religious Foundations for Moral Values

Augustine on Faith and Knowledge

The Euthyphro Problem

Natural and Human Foundations for Moral Values

Nature and Natural Law

Ethical Naturalism

Reason

Self


8.4 Well-Being

Hedonism

Epicurus's Hedonism

Utilitarianism

Qualitative Distinctions in Pleasure

Pleasure as a State of Mind

The Experience Machine (a Thought Experiment)

Well-Being and the Satisfaction of Desire

Cognitivism and Non-cognitivism

Emotivism

Well-Being and Objective Goods

Knowledge

Virtue

Friendship

Eudaimonia (Human Flourishing)

Ancient Greek View of Eudaimonia

G.E.M. Anscombe and Modern Eudaimonia


8.5 Aesthetics