Chapter 8 — Value Theory
8.1 The Fact-Value Distinction
Descriptive vs. Evaluative Claims
Descriptive Claims: How the World Is
Evaluative Claims: How the World Ought to Be
The Naturalistic Fallacy
Hume and the Is-Ought Problem
The Open-Question Argument
Objections to the Fact-Value Distinction
Putnam's Objection to the Fact-Value Distinction
Lack of Distinction Claims
Claims of Objective Moral Reasoning
8.2 Basic Questions about Values
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value
Fundamentality
Incommensurability
Moral Pluralism vs. Moral Relativism
Ontology of Value
Realism and Anti-realism
The Importance of Debate within Moral Realism
The Importance of Moral Resolution
Divine and Religious Foundations for Moral Values
Augustine on Faith and Knowledge
The Euthyphro Problem
Natural and Human Foundations for Moral Values
Nature and Natural Law
Ethical Naturalism
Reason
Self
8.4 Well-Being
Hedonism
Epicurus's Hedonism
Utilitarianism
Qualitative Distinctions in Pleasure
Pleasure as a State of Mind
The Experience Machine (a Thought Experiment)
Well-Being and the Satisfaction of Desire
Cognitivism and Non-cognitivism
Emotivism
Well-Being and Objective Goods
Knowledge
Virtue
Friendship
Eudaimonia (Human Flourishing)
Ancient Greek View of Eudaimonia
G.E.M. Anscombe and Modern Eudaimonia
8.5 Aesthetics